UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Skip Aubrey Logan,) C/A No. 4:14-2940-JFA-TER
)
Plaintiff,)
) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
VS.) (for partial summary dismissal)
)
Life Recovery Solutions; F. Gareth Beshears; Nick)
Robinette; J. Ruben Long Detention Center,	
)
Defendants.)
)

This is a civil action filed *pro se* by a state inmate. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff has brought suit against the J. Ruben Long Detention Center; Life Recovery Solutions ("LRS"), the Director of LRS, and a LRS counselor. In a separately-filed order, the undersigned is authorizing service of process upon LRS and the individual defendants.

INITIAL REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v.*

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *De'Lonta v. Angelone*, 330 F. 3d 630, 630n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to partial summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he or she was injured by "the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws" by a "person" acting "under color of state law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (2002). It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." The J. Ruben Long Detention Center is a group of buildings or a facility. Inanimate objects (such as buildings, facilities, and grounds) do not act under color of state law. Hence, the J. Ruben Long

4:14-cv-02940-MGL Date Filed 10/07/14 Entry Number 21 Page 3 of 4

Detention Center is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Preval v. Reno, 57

F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore

not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); and Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp.

1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a

person amenable to suit.").

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court summarily dismiss the J. Ruben Long

Detention Center from the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service

of process. See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204

& n. * (4th Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (essentially a redesignation of "old" 1915(d)); and

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases

to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

The plaintiff's attention is directed to the Notice on the next page.

October 7, 2014 Florence, South Carolina s/Thomas E. Rogers, III Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge

3

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 2317 Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).